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INTRODUCTION

Public comment sessions at city council meetings are a time for
citizens to speak freely on issues that are not scheduled for a meeting's
agenda.' In this public forum, 2 a citizen can speak about the cleanliness
of a park, the effectiveness of a non-littering law, or a highly contested
zoning ordinance. 3 A comment session is essentially a time where
elected officials listen to the concerns of the citizens they serve. 4 The
government promotes the goals of the Florida Sunshine Laws by
striving for increased transparency and openness, and also by protecting
First Amendment values. However, the public forum doctrine may
interfere with the success of the Florida Sunshine Law's advancement
of democracy. 6 Based on the doctrine's malleable boundaries, it is hard
to distinguish the government's proper curtailment of speech regulating
the purpose of the forum from its improper suppression of speech at city
council meetings.7
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized three categories of
regulations on expression or free speech-content-neutral, contentbased and viewpoint-based. 8 A content-neutral regulation is reviewed
under intermediate scrutiny and "will be sustained if 'it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.' 9 A content-0
based regulation requires the higher standard of strict scrutiny review.'
1. See Brian Adams, Public Meetings and the Democratic Process, 64 PUB. ADMrN.
REv. 1, 43-52 (2004) (discussing how citizens' speech gives officials a better understanding of
public opinion).
2. See infra Part I.
3. These are several issues, among others, that a citizen is permitted to discuss at a
public comment session.
4. See Adams, supra note 1, at 43-52.
5. See generally Erin Borry & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, An Analytical Frameworkfor
Open Meetings and Transparency, 15 PuB. ADMIN. & MGMT. 138, 141-43 (2010) (discussing
how state sunshine laws may increase the transparency of governments by having citizens
participate in local meetings).
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. Dan v. Kozolowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination:Malleable Terms Beget
MalleableDoctrine, 13 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 131, 131 (2008).
9. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-63 (1994) (quoting the standard
held by the Court in United States v. 0' Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
10. See Sable Commc'nsv. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
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Such a regulation may restrain a particular type or subject matter of
speech if it promotes a compelling interest that is achieved in the least
restrictive means necessary. 1 Lastly, viewpoint-based laws are facially
unconstitutional. 12 Such laws distort public debate by regulating "one
side of a debate or topic but not the other."' 3
Whether a city regulation is upheld depends largely on its label.' 4
The problem with this categorical analysis is that the U.S. Supreme
Court has inadequately developed a criterion for determining where a
regulation falls in a public forum. 15 Although the distinction between
content and viewpoint discrimination is obvious in definition, the Court
overlaps the two concepts in application.' 6 Therefore, lower courts have
extreme difficulty determining what type of scrutiny is appropriate for
17
an ordinance that suppresses speech at city council meetings.
Another consequence of the U.S. Supreme Court's imprecise
guidelines is that public speech in limited public fora is especially
vulnerable to government censorship. 18 A city council meeting is a
limited public forum because it is a non-traditional venue that the
government opens "[f]or certain groups or for the discussion of certain
topics."' 9 In such a forum, the government can regulate the content of a
citizen's speech if it interferes with the purpose of the meeting, but it
cannot regulate a citizen's viewpoint.2 ° If the government incorrectly
labels a viewpoint-based regulation as content-based, a citizen's speech
is improperly censored. 21 The arbitrariness of these categories is
injurious to, rather than protective of, free speech. 2 As a result, city
council administrators are given too much discretion to regulate speech.
The lower courts and government administrators' difficulty in
11.

See id.

12. Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality:Inconsistent Applications of an
IncreasinglyMalleableDoctrine, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 69, 77 (1997).
13.

Id.

14. Kozolowski, supra note 8, at 131-32. The Court uses strict scrutiny for content-based
regulations and intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations. However, regulations that
discriminate based on viewpoint are always unconstitutional. See id.
15. Id. at 131; see generally Calvert, supra note 12, at 70; Leslie Gielow Jacobs,
Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34
McGEORGE L. REv. 595 (2003); Barry McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content

Approach to Protectingthe Freedom of Expression, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1347 (2006).
16. See generally infra Part I.B; infra text accompanying note 59.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18.

See infraPart I.A.2-B.I.

19. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)); see also Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 44-47.
21. See infra Part lI.B.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
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applying the limited public forum doctrine in city council meetings is
especially apparent in ambiguous situations where a citizen expresses
his or her viewpoint, but in an inappropriate manner. In the absence of
uniform standards, broad governmental discretion to apply a
constitutional doctrine harms free speech. Consider the following three
hypotheticals: the first involves political speech, the second involves
religious speech, and the third involves profane speech, each expressed
during the public comment period at city council meetings.
In the first hypothetical, Bob attended a meeting during an ongoing
election to discuss the foreclosure crisis. He wore a button displaying
the mayor smoking marijuana. 23 At this same meeting, Sam's speech
went uninterrupted when he discussed how his environmental
consulting firm could raise revenue for local businesses. Sam's firm has
made large donations to the mayor's campaign. The city does have an
ordinance that prohibits campaigning or advertising during public
comment periods.
In the second hypothetical, preacher Paul came to a meeting to voice
his concerns about the opening of an abortion clinic across from his
church. Paul complied with the city's rule, and obtained approval for his
speech's topic prior to the meeting. At the public comment session, Paul
spoke as if he were conducting a sermon, citing the bible numerous
times. 24 Paul also said, "Jesus thinks abortion doctors are murderers."
Yet, the priest stayed on topic and complied with the city's time limit
for each speaker during the comment period.
In the third hypothetical, Connor, a college student, attended an open
forum meeting to discuss a city ordinance that denied sexual education
funding. During his speech he described the ordinance as "fu*king
bullsh*t." 25 The city does not have an ordinance that directly addresses
profanity. Rather, its ordinance merely prohibits disturbances during
comment periods.
Should the cities have unbridled power to suppress Bob's, Paul's,
and Connor's speech to conduct orderly and efficient meetings? Does it
matter if their speeches are offensive to the other citizens at the
meetings? Are broader bans on disruptive behavior acceptable or must
regulations specifically prohibit conduct? Finally, does the First
Amendment trump the government's curtailment of speech in the
hypotheticals?
These questions ought to have simple and clear answers, but they do
23. This hypothetical is based on Cleveland v. City of Cocoa Beach, 221 F. App'x 875
(11 th Cir. 2007). See infra Parts III.A.1 & IV.C.1.
24. This hypothetical is based on Rubin v. City of Burbank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (2002).
See infra Parts III.A.2 & IV.C.2.
25. This hypothetical is based on Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1989). See
infra Parts III.A.2 & IV.C.2.
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not. 26 This Note will further analyze these issues by examining the
current precedents for free speech in the public forum doctrine, as well
as analyzing how the U.S. Supreme Court's inconsistent application
27
permits governmental discrimination against a person's viewpoint.
After such examination, one can revisit the aforementioned
hypotheticals to shed light on how the government's control of a
meeting shapes the permissibility of a citizen's speech,28 and how this
control seemingly conflicts with the purpose of the Florida Sunshine
Laws.29 By regulating the time, manner, and type of speech permitted in
a city council
meeting, the government often sacrifices a citizen's
30
viewpoint.
Part I reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's current standard for public
forum law and its overlapping categories of content-based and viewedbased discrimination. Parts II and III highlight this problem through
caselaw at the U.S. Supreme Court and lower court levels, respectively.
Part IV contrasts the Florida Sunshine Laws' encouragement of citizens
to attend meetings with the state's strict regulation of public speech at
such meetings. This part also addresses why public forum law, as
applied to the hypotheticals, should be clarified in light of the Florida
Sunshine Laws' policies. Finally, the conclusion proposes suggestions
as to how Florida's local governments can create guidelines for
protecting citizens from viewpoint discrimination.
I. PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
A. The Murky Categories
While the First Amendment protects an individual's right to free
speech, this right is not unlimited. 31 "[I]n evaluating a citizen's right to
express his opinion on public property" the Court has established
"certain boundaries" that balance "a citizen's First Amendment rights
26.
27.

See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
See infra Part IJ.A-B.

28.
29.
30.
31.

See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.A-C.
See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
See Steve Dijulio, Council Meeting Conduct and Citizen Rights under the First

Amendment, MUN. RES. & SERVS. CTR. of WASH., Nov. 2009, availableat http://www.mrsc.org/

focus/ccadvisor/ccal 109.aspx; A. Fleming Bell, II, John Stephens et al., Public Comment at
Meetings of Local Government Boards Part Two: Common Practices and Legal Standards,

POPULAR GOV'T, 27, 31 (1997) ("The fact that restrictions on speech in designated public forums
generally may not be based on what a speaker has to say about a subject does not mean that
those who attend the meeting may speak freely whenever they wish or on whatever topic they
wish.").
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and the government's interest in limiting the use of its property" to the
Such property is a public forum, or property that the
public.
33
government has opened for the public's expressive activity and use.
Over time, the Court has created three categories: a traditional public
34
forum, a designated or limited public forum, and a non-public forum.
1. The Traditional Public Forum
A traditional public forum is property that has had a longstanding
dedication to assembly or debate, such as a street or a public park.35 The
government's power to monitor expressive activity in this category is
greatly limited. 36 Thus, content-based regulations within a traditional
public forum are subject to strict scrutiny. However, the government
may regulate the "time, place, and manner of expression which are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
of
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels
communication." 38 In addition, a traditional public forum's
constitutional restraints may apply to a separate category called a
"designated public forum," 39 consisting "of public property which the
state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity."4 ° The government may either open a designated forum to the
public as a whole or establish it as a designated, but limited forum.4 1
2. The Limited Public Forum
In a limited public forum, the government's regulation is subject to
less restrictive judicial scrutiny than a traditional forum but more
restrictive scrutiny than a non-public forum.4 2 A limited public forum is
created when the government intentionally opens a non-public forum
for expressive use by a limited class of speakers or for discussion on
32. Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1989).
33. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
34. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998).
35. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
36. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 45-46. In the public forum doctrine, a designated public forum may be
considered a separate category but this is beyond the scope of this Note. Id.
40.

See id. at 45.

41. See Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARv. L. REV. 2140, 2142, 2146
(2009) ("[I]t is unclear whether there is a single middle forum category, several subcategories,
or whether a forum can be designated one way for one class of speakers and another way for
others.").
42. See Cleveland v. City of Cocoa Beach, No. 6:02-CV-1294-ORL22KR, 2003 WL
25739839, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2003).
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certain subjects.4 3 City council meetings set up for public discussion are
limited public fora, and thus, the city is required to "respect the lawful
boundaries it has itself set." 44 The government can freely regulate the
content in a city council meeting because the meeting is created to
accomplish certain objectives for the city-even during a public
comment session.45 However, the city can neither "exclude speech
where its distinction is not 'reasonable in light of the purpose served by
the forum,"' nor "discriminate against speech on the basis of its
viewpoint. ' 46 Thus, the government can regulate the content of a
citizen's speech, but it can never discriminate against a citizen's
viewpoint.
3. The Non-Public Forum
In a non-public forum, the government may impose viewpointneutral restrictions that are reasonable in light of the forum's purpose
and its surrounding circumstances. 48 An example of a non-public forum
is a government meeting that is reserved for legislative staff exclusively
and not open to the public. In this forum, the Court reviews regulations
with the least amount of judicial scrutiny, since these meetings are
mainly held for administrative purposes and are not designed to serve as
a forum for public debate.49
B. Limited PublicForum 's Labeling Problem: Content-Basedv.
Viewpoint-BasedDiscrimination
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that viewpoint discrimination in a
limited public forum setting is not distinct, but rather, a more
43. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (citing
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
44. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
Examples of lawful boundaries include meeting rules restricting the amount of time each
speaker speaks, exclusion of speech due to inappropriate behavior, or irrelevant speech. Id.
45. In Rowe v. City of Cocoa, No. 6:02-CV-1295-ORL-31KRS, 2003 WL 22102150, at
*6 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2003), content discrimination, such as who may speak at a meeting, is
permissible.
46. Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829.
47. See Cleveland, 2003 WL 25739839 at *3. But see Ark. Educ., 523 U.S. at 677
(holding that "[i]f the government excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a
designated public forum is made generally available, its action is subject to strict scrutiny.").
48. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
49. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981)); Consol.
Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. New
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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exaggerated form of content discrimination. 50 In Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the University of Virginia, viewpoint discrimination is
described as a conspicuously bad form of content discrimination. 51 In
R.A. V v. St. Paul, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that content
discrimination becomes egregious when the government targets the
viewpoints of speakers on a subject, rather than the subject matter of the
speech.52 Such a description does not facilitate the U.S Supreme Court's
bright-line categorical approach because it fuses, rather than separates,
the two concepts. 53 Hence, lower courts are able to pick and choose
when to classify a regulation as viewpoint-based.54
In a limited public forum setting, content discrimination of speech is
55
permissible if the restriction preserves the purpose of the forum.
However, viewpoint discrimination is never permissible because the
government cannot regulate speech in a limited public forum if the
"ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale
for the restriction. ' ' 56 The subtle distinction between content and
viewpoint discrimination in application is problematic because the
scope of what falls under viewpoint is not clearly identified. 57 The result
is that forum administrators and courts have unbridled discretion over
what speech is acceptable for meetings.
Legal scholars are fascinated by the predicament of labeling
restrictions on speech in limited public fora. For instance, Professor
Dan V. Kozolowski has criticized the U.S. Supreme Court's failure to
"adequately define the terms and the criteria to be used in determining
whether content or viewpoint discrimination is present." 59 Alternatively,
50. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
51. Id.
52. 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
53. See infra text accompanying note 57.
54. See infra Part III.
55. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
56. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). For
further discussion on viewpoint discrimination, see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); Parkland Republican Club v. City of Parkland, 268 F.
Supp. 2d 1349, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17; Majorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99,100-05 (1996). Legal scholar Majorie Heins describes the U.S.
Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions as following three trends: (1) flip-flopping
between overturning regulations based on viewpoint discrimination or the broader content
discrimination; (2) fusing the two concepts as an attempt to control public debate and suppress
disfavored ideas; and (3) analyzing how closely related content is to viewpoint. Id.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 15 & 57; infra text accompanying note 59.
59. Kozolowski, supra note 8, at 131. For a further discussion of the shortcomings of the
public forum doctrine, see, for example, David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine,
78 IOWA L. REV. 143, 186 (1992); Wilson Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionalityof Laws that
are Both Content-Basedand Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND.
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Professor Clay Calvert has argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's
subjective application of scrutiny stems from its inquiry of legislative
intent. He criticizes this approach as speculative because the bench
can codify legislative intent in radically different ways by analyzing one
purpose, among the many, behind a regulation. 6 1 Moreover, Calvert
disfavors this method because some justices base their decisions on the
overriding purpose of a law. 62 Through this approach, the justices have
discretion to choose one "overriding" purpose that may not be contentbased. 63 By interpreting one purpose as falling under the content-neutral
category, the U.S. Supreme Court may uphold a regulation because it is
subject to less judicial scrutiny. 64 Consequently, the U.S. Supreme
Court may sacrifice an individual's viewpoint through its
characterization of a law's overriding purpose, regardless of the law's
effect on free speech.65
Without sufficient guidelines, governments struggle to apply the
limited public forum test to city council meetings. 66 In the absence of
precise guidelines, a citizen's permissible viewpoint is often swept into
a pool of content, and judged against the aforementioned lower degree
of scrutiny. 67 State actors may indeed profit from this grey area in First
Amendment law by suppressing unfavorable, but permissible, speech by
labeling it as inappropriate.

L.J. 801, 803 (2004); Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment
andNetworked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REv. 1,50-51 (2007).
60. See Calvert, supra note 12, at 108.
61. Id. at 93. In Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), for
example, the majority held that the statute's must-carry provisions, that forced cable operators to
carry a certain amount of local channels, were content-neutral because this burden applied to all
cable operators equally and did not affect the type of programs that the cable networks carried.
Id. at 645. In contrast, Justice O'Connor rejected the majority's approach because it required a
speculative determination of legislative purpose. See Calvert, supra note 12, at 106 (citing
Turner, 512 U.S. at 676-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
62. See Calvert, supra note 12, at 88, 105-06.
63. Id. at 105-06.
64. See id. at 71-72.
65. See id.
66. See supra Part I.A.2.
67. See supra text accompanying note 14. Although scholars have extensively written
about free speech restrictions in public fora such as schools, sidewalks, and parks, scholarship
on individual speech at city council meetings is lacking. See infra text accompanying notes 17277.
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II. CASELAW REGARDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTENTBASED AND VIEWPOINT-BASED DISCRIMINATION

A. U.S. Supreme CourtDecisions
To illustrate the unclear distinction between content-based and
viewpoint-based discrimination, a review of the U.S. Supreme Court's
record with the public forum doctrine is necessary. This Note groups
such decisions into three categories: political speech, religious speech,
and obscene or profane speech. These three categories are susceptible to
censorship at city council meetings, and thus,68are relevant to unveiling
the shortcomings of the public forum doctrine.
1. Political Speech
The Court has consistently held that political viewpoints are integral
to First Amendment speech and expression. 69 However, the highest
Court refrained from categorizing political speech as viewpoint-based in
7 1 Prior to this decision,
the public forum until 1995,70 in Rosenberger.
the U.S. Supreme Court avoided addressing the restriction of political
speech as viewpoint-based by applying non-public forum analysis. 72 For
example, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the government upheld
banning political advertising because city transit cars did not qualify as
a public forum.7 3 Based on this characterization, the Lehman Court
applied less scrutiny to the restriction. 74 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme
Court evaded classifying the ban as a content-based or viewpoint-based
restriction. 75 Instead, bus-riders were described as a captive audience
and thus, city managers had a reasonable purpose76 in limiting this space
from "innocuous" and "commercial" advertising.
The U.S. Supreme Court also avoided labeling the suppression of
political speech as viewpoint-based discrimination by classifying it as
entirely content-based in a non-public forum. 77 In Cornelius v. NAACP
68. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of political, religious, and low-value
speech, including profanity, is relevant because it gives context to the hypotheticals addressed in
Part IV.C.
69. See Heins, supra note 57, at 122 n.122 (listing cases where the U.S. Supreme Court
has recognized that political viewpoints are vital to First Amendment expression).
70. Seeid. at ll6.
71. 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); see infra text accompanying notes 92-96.
72. See Heins, supra note 57, at 116-17; supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
73. 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
74. See id. at 304.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See Heins, supra note 57, at 116-22.
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Legal Defense & EducationalFund,political speech was excluded from
a federal charity drive because the restriction seemed "reasonabl[y]"
designed to avoid political preference. 78 In this case, the regulation
banned political content across the board to avoid the promotion of
certain political groups over others.7 9 However, non-profit, tax-exempt
health and welfare groups were permitted to participate in the drive. 0
The U.S. Supreme Court held "that the Government does not violate the
First Amendment when it limits participation" to certain groups "in
order to minimize disruption to the federal workplace, to ensure the
success of the fund-raising effort, or to avoid the appearance of political
8
favoritism without regard to the viewpoint of the excluded groups." 1
Although this decision resembled viewpoint-based discrimination in
both purpose and effect, this broad content-based categorization granted
state actors the ability to exclude political views under the guise that
such speech contained impermissible content. 82
In contrast, in FCC v. League of Women Voters,83 the U.S. Supreme
Court maintained the content-viewpoint distinction; however, the Court
did so in a way that fused, rather than distinguished, the categories from
each other. 84 In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a ban
suppressing the opinions of broadcasters that received public funds to
discuss "controversial issues" of great importance. 85 This is because the
"First Amendment forbade the Government from using the forum in an
unconventional way to suppress speech inherent in the nature of the
medium." 86 Yet again, this decision was exclusively based on content
discrimination. 87 Although the ban regulated only controversial
78. 473 U.S. 788, 813, 806 (1985). According to the Cornelius Court, the discrimination
was not based on viewpoint, but rather only the speaker and subject matter of the speech. See
Heins, supra note 57, at 113 n.75.
79. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806-07.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 813.
82. See Heins, supra note 57, at 116-17. The Cornelius Court did, in fact, recognize the
likely occurrence of the government using content restrictions as a pretext for the censorship of
controversial speech: "'[T]he purported concern to avoid controversy excited by particular
groups may conceal a bias against the viewpoint advanced by the excluded speakers."' Id. at
113 n.75 (quoting Cornelius,473 U.S. at 812).
83. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
84. See Heins, supra note 57, at 118.
85. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 381.
86. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001) (discussing the holding in
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 395-96).
87. See Heins, supra note 57, at 117. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in League of
Women Voters stands for content-based discrimination extending not only to particular
viewpoints, but also to the prohibition of public discussion on an entire topic. Id. This analysis
was unhelpful because the Court still allows "explicit suppression of specific ideas and types of
content discrimination deemed to be relatively untroubling as a First Amendment matter .... "
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89
speech,88 the Court declined to label it as discriminatory of viewpoint.
Rather, by reasoning that the ban invalidated a wholesale category of
speech, the Court indicated
that content-based discrimination was
9
sufficient to overturn it. 0

2. Religious Speech
In contrast to political speech cases, the U.S. Supreme Court readily
labeled religious bans as viewpoint-based discrimination in public fora.
In Lamb s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,the
bench took a more open approach to viewpoint categorization of
speech. 91 The Lamb 's Chapel Court held that a school's prohibition of a
religious group's film about family during non-school hours was
impermissibly viewpoint-based because secular groups would have
92
been allowed to use the school premise to address the same subject.
As a result, the concept of viewpoint-based speech
was expanded "to
'' 3
embrace broad 'perspectives' such as religion. 0
Unlike its previous fusing of the content-based and viewpoint-based
categories for political speech cases, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Rosenberger, extended Lamb's Chapel's broader concept of viewpointbased discrimination for religious speech. 94 The Rosenberger Court held
that a state university rule, denying school funding to religious
publications, was viewpoint-based discrimination. 95 This case is distinct
from the prior cases regarding political speech because the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs religious viewpoint, rather than
the religious content in the publication, drove the exclusion. 96 The
university's ban qualified as viewpoint discrimination because it funded
publications that discussed religion from a secular perspective
but
97
religion.
discussed
directly
that
publications
to
funding
denied
The Rosenberger decision has significance beyond its religious
Id.at 118.
88. This is the definition of viewpoint discrimination. See supra text accompanying note
13.
89. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 384.
90. See id.; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988) (overturning a contentbased law that banned protests critical of a foreign government within 500 feet of the
government's embassy).
91. 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Heins, supra note 57, at 120.
92. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393.
93. Heins, supra note 57, at 120.
94. See id. at 120-21; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 845-46 (1995).
95. Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 845.
96. Id. at 831.
97. Id.
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subject because it makes the profound assertion that the suppression of
98
speech in limited public fora may stem from its political content.
Scholar Marjorie Heins argues that Rosenberger compels the conclusion
that restrictions on "political," "offensive," or "controversial" speech, 99
must fall under the viewpoint-based category because the government is
no longer able to "skew" public debate by disadvantaging whole
categories of ideas.100 Since Rosenberger, state actors should not be able
to ban political speech0 by curtailing its content for the "purpose" of the
city council meeting.' '
3. Obscene Speech
Restrictions that involve sexual, vulgar, or profane elements fall
within the category of obscene speech cases. °2 The government may
prohibit obscenity without reference to the First Amendment because
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it is "utterly without redeeming
social importance" and it includes "no essential part of any exposition
of ideas." 03 As Professor John Fee has described, obscene speech is an
exception to constitutional protection because of its "low-value" and
"high-harm.' 0 4 Speech that is excluded from the First Amendment is
protection of heightened scrutiny due to its
indeed excluded from the
5
lack of positive value. 10
For material to be classified as obscene and thus not protected by the
First Amendment, the Miller v. Californiatest requires the government
to prove that material, taken as a whole, (1) appeals to a prurient interest
based on community standards, (2) depicts sexual content defined by
state law in a "patently offensive" imanner,
,,06 (3) "lacks serious
"" u and
"'
Professor Majorie
scientific
value.
literary, artistic, political, or
Heins argues that because the second prong is measured in part by
patent offensiveness, obscene speech is most likely a viewpoint-based
term. 107
98.
99.

See id.
at 829-30.
Heins, supra note 57, at 122.

100.

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831-32.

101.
102.

Heins, supra note 57, at 121-22; see supra Part I.B.
Other examples of low value speech include incitement, threats, fighting words, and

child pornography. John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1103, 1104, 1146 (2005).

103.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.

476, 485-86 (1957)).

104. Fee, supra note 102, at 1146 (describing the test for obscenity as the same for
profanity).
105. See id.
106. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Hereinafter, this test will be referred to as the Miller test.
107. Heins, supra note 57, at 123. The application of obscenity as a viewpoint-based term
also applies to profanity, since the First Amendment has less protection for both categories of
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Irrespective of obscene speech's classification as viewpoint-based,
overbroad regulations are often permitted. In United States v. Stevens,
the government attempted to apply Miller to justify classifying a statute,
banning the sale of crush videos, not overly. The U.S. Supreme Court
stated that the word "serious" in the third prong of the Miller test was
included to distinguish speech that qualified as obscene from speech
that did not require such stringent regulation. 10 9 The majority in Stevens
did not assert that a determination of "serious value [can] be used as a
general precondition to protecting other types of speech in the first
place. Most of what we say to one another lacks 'religious, political,
scientific ...or artistic value' (let alone serious value), but it is still
sheltered from government regulation."' " 0 Although Stevens struck
down the law as being overbroad,"' the U.S. Supreme Court still makes
viewpoint-based determinations that are often subjective. Even though
this case suggests that Miller can and will be limited, 112 since there is no
concrete definition of obscenity,11 3 it fails to remove much of the U.S.
Supreme Court's ad hoc application. Stevens does not prevent the
government from passing overbroad regulations that, in other cases,
might hold up based on the moral viewpoints of the nine justices. 114
Although public school officials have extensive power in regulating
children's expression at school, 1 5 in this limited public forum, the
1 16
standard for sexual speech is laden with viewpoint-based distinctions.

speech. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
108. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010). Crush videos show the
crushing of small animals. Id. at 1583. This statute also criminalized non-obscene material such
as the selling of hunting materials through magazines. Id. at 1589.
109. Id. at 1591.
110. Id. (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
111. Id. at 1592 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006), which criminalized the
commercialization of animal cruelty, was overbroad and violated the First Amendment because
its intended reach of outlawing crush videos and animal fighting also banned non-obscene
speech such as hunting magazines).
112. Seeid.at1591.
113. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 19.
114. The U.S. Supreme Court may choose to regard profane and obscene speech as
entirely without constitutional value for a given case. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying
text.
115. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (holding
that school officials may regulate student speech that "materially and substantially" interferes
with the requirements of school rules or collides with the rights of others). For example, in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the school board's power to control the content of student speech in school sponsored
publications.
116. See Heins, supra note 57, at 132; Virgil v. Sch. Bd. 862 F.2d 1517, 1519-23 (11th
Cir. 1989) (holding that a school board's power to remove an anthology with sexual content was
not viewpoint discrimination because exclusion was based on legitimate pedagogical concerns).
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7 the U.S. Supreme Court
In Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser,"1
rejected a student's First Amendment challenge against the school's
suppression of his assembly speech because it included a phallic
8 Delivering the majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren Earl
metaphor. 11
Burger held that the school's penalties did not qualify as viewpointbased discrimination.' 19 Chief Justice Burger's rationale for upholding
the restriction stemmed from the speech's disruptive effect on the
school's fundamental values. 12 Moreover, Chief Justice Burger's
holding subtly acknowledged that sexual speech is too obscene for
children.121 A school engages in viewpoint-based discrimination when it
excludes sexual speech that passes the Miller test, like Vladimir
Nabokov's Lolita, but permits other comparable speech at school. 22
The Fraser decision is significant because it illustrates that a
viewpoint-based restriction is not always per se unconstitutional. 123 As
Chief Justice Burger's opinion conveys,
sexual speech at schools is
disruptive and inappropriate in many contexts, especially when it is
expressed in front of a younger audience. 125 Although Justice Thurgood
Marshall agreed with the majority opinion that school officials need
significant discretion to regulate the school's educational purpose, in his
dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated, "nevertheless, where speech
is involved, we may not unquestioningly accept a teacher's or an
administrator's assertion that certain pure speech interfered with
education.' ' 126 This dissenting opinion infers that for sexual speech, the
U.S. Supreme Court must examine whether a school has proven that an
educational purpose has been disrupted before it can uphold a
potentially overbroad
regulation that permits suppression of allegedly
127
speech.
immoral

B. Relevance of the Viewpoint Labelfor ControversialSpeech
It is critical that the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes political,
117.
118.

478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id.at 685.

119. Id.The Court determined that school officials could censor vulgar expression to
promote civility and protect the interests of female students. Id. at 681-83.
120.
121.

See id. at 686-87.
See id.

122. See supra text accompanying note 13.
123. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. "The First Amendment does not prevent the school
officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent's would
undermine the school's basic educational mission." Id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
125. See Fraser,478 U.S. at 683-84.
126. Id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. See id.
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religious, and obscene (or profane) speech as viewpoint-based in a
limited public forum. 128 If not, then the government can easily ban
speech that is not disruptive to a meeting's purpose but is instead
contrary to the taste of a forum administrator. 29 As feminist writer
Catherine MacKinnon aptly observed about obscenity, which can also
apply to political, religious, and profane speech: "When do you see a
viewpoint as a viewpoint? When you don't agree with it. When is a
viewpoint not a viewpoint? When it's yours."13" Accordingly, if a state
actor recognizes a citizen's speech as viewpoint-based, ignores it, and
frames it as violating a content-based regulation, then that speech is
easily suppressed.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION TO LOWER COURT CASES
A. Backgroundof Political,Religious, and ProfaneSpeech
In the limited public forum of a city council meeting, lower court
decisions insufficiently safeguard viewpoint-based speech. 13 1 Both state
and federal courts treat political, religious, and profane speech as
32
disruptive and permit forum administrators' discretion to exclude it.'
This is true even when such speech reflects a citizen's viewpoint and
the government could not prove that it disrupted a meeting's purpose.133
Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court, the lower courts continue to allow
the government to censor a citizen's speech that it characterizes as
controversial content.' 34 Therefore, the courts' decisions indicate that
government control of a forum's content justifies, when necessary, its
disposal of citizens' viewpoints.
B. PoliticalExpression
In the Eleventh Circuit opinion of Cleveland v. City of Cocoa Beach
(Florida), an audience member at a city council meeting alleged that his
First Amendment rights were violated when the mayor told him he
could not wear a t-shirt that displayed a political message regarding an

128. See supra Part I.A.2.
129. See supra Part I.A.2.
130. CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
212(1985).
131.

132.
2007).
133.
134.

See infra Part III.A.1-3.

See, e.g., Cleveland v. City of Cocoa Beach, 221 F. App'x 875, 877-78 (11th Cir.
See id.
See infra Part III.A.1-3.
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ongoing mayoral race.135 Prior to this incident, citizens wearing political
speech had never disrupted meetings nor did the city have a regulation
prohibiting it. 1 36 This opinion affirmed the district court's decision that
suppressing campaign messages in the limited public forum "was
content-based, but viewpoint neutral.' 37 The court held that the city did
not violate the First Amendment because the city could reasonably
establish a campaign-free zone to limit political influence on its
employees and conduct orderly meetings.138 The court' s opinion is very
similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Cornelius,1 9 in that both
courts endorsed a wholesale ban of political content regardless of a
citizen's viewpoint. 140 The Cleveland court found that this form of
suppression was viewpoint-neutral because another citizen's button,
which had a message that was favorable to the mayor's campaign, had
also been banned from the meeting.141
The citizen's t-shirt expressed a message of political dissatisfaction
with the current government. 142 In free expression cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court has reviewed whether a regulation is related to the
suppression, and should thus require greater scrutiny. 143 In Cleveland,
the court could not determine whether the mayor's purpose of
suppressing the t-shirt was related to enforcing a regulation, because
none existed.' 44 Although the mayor argued that the city had a policy
prohibiting the display of campaign messages, 145 the citizen had no way
of knowing that his t-shirt was inappropriate, given the purpose of the
meeting. Without a regulation forbidding the citizen's behavior, it

135. See Cleveland, 221 F. App'x at 877-78. In this case, a former city commissioner,
Albert Cleveland, attended a meeting during Mayor Janice Scott's campaign for re-election and
wore a t-shirt displaying, "VOTE SKIP BEELER FOR MAYOR." Id.at 877.
136.

See id. at 877.

137. Id. at 878-79.
138. Id.at 879; see also Rowe v. City of Cocoa Beach, 358 F.3d 800, 803 (11th Cir. 2004)
(stating that "[t]here is a significant governmental interest in conducting orderly, efficient,
meetings of public bodies." (citing Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1989))).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
140. See Cleveland, 221 F. App'x at 877-78; supra text accompanying notes 78-80. This is
a form of content-based discrimination that is permitted in a limited public forum when the
regulation is based on a significant government purpose that is achieved in the least restrictive
means. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11. This standard is known as strict scrutiny. See

supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
141. Cleveland,221 F. App'x at 877-79.
142. Id. at 877; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (burning a flag in
protest of President Reagan's re-nomination for presidency was political expression).
143. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
144. Cleveland,221 F. App'x at 877.
145. Id.
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46
appeared as if the mayor made up the rules as the meeting progressed. 1
In the process of preserving the meeting's order, the mayor punished a
citizen not because he violated a content-based regulation, but because
of his viewpoint. 147 Thus, the determination of whether the t-shirt was
appropriate in light of the forum's purpose, required the court to engage
in a viewpoint-based analysis.148

C. Religious Speech: An Outlier?
Lower courts, under the viewpoint-based category, have reviewed
regulations and court orders banning religious speech more frequently
than regulations and court orders banning political speech at city
council meetings. 149 Professor John Fee argues that religious speech is
treated as viewpoint-based because the "[g]overnment may not engage
in religious viewpoint discrimination as an exercise of government
speech because the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit
government endorsement of religious views, not because the Speech
Clause requires viewpoint neutrality.' 5 0 Based on this argument, the
different treatment for private, religious speech, as compared with
political or profane speech, has nothing to do with the Establishment
Clause, 151 or the religious content of the speech itself. Specifically, in
Rosenberger, the Court rejected an argument that the Establishment
Clause required a state university's exclusion of an evangelical
magazine from its funding scheme.152 Courts continue to address
religious speech in terms of viewpoint, rather than content, because the
Constitution prevents the government from discriminating against
religious viewpoints. 53 This special treatment of religion does not
extend to political or profane speech because the Constitution does not

146. See id.
147. See id. at 877.
148. See supra Parts I.B. & M.A.
149. See generally Rubin v. City of Burbank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
150. Fee, supra note 102, at 1167 n.291 (citing U.S. CONST.amend. I).
151. See id.But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Speech, 124 HARv. L. REV.,
143, 166 (2010) (claiming that the Establishment Clause gives the government special reason to
exclude religious groups from public entities).
152. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837-46 (1995).
153.

See Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48,329 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding that the exclusion of Hill's camp brochure was viewpoint-based discrimination because
the brochure was limited due to its religious content); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1091
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "[t]he School District's restriction on access to facilities [was]
based purely on the World Changer's religious viewpoint in violation of the First
Amendment."); cf Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 231 F.3d 937, 942-43 (5th Cir.
2000) (holding that the regulation was not viewpoint-based because its plain language permitted
the expression of religious viewpoints).
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54
offer the same protection for the other categories.'
In Rubin v. City of Burbank,155 religious speech was analyzed under
the category of viewpoint. In this case, a minister delivered a prayer to
begin a meeting,' 56 and invoked the name of Jesus Christ.' 57 Offended
by this religious speech, a Jewish citizen filed a lawsuit alleging that the
religious reference was unconstitutional. 158 The trial court ruled that the
prayer, which reflected a specific religion's beliefs, was sectarian; thus,
the trial court enjoined the council from conducting such prayers before
council meetings. 5 9 The appellate court then had to determine whether
the trial court's60ban on sectarian prayer constituted viewpoint-based
discrimination. 1
By following the court order of advising volunteers that sectarian
prayers are not permitted for council invocation, the city argued that it
was forced to censor "the speech of those who seek to address the city
council."' 16' The city's argument was based on the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions in Perry Education Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass 'n and Rosenberger, 162 where the government's regulations were
reviewed under a viewpoint-based test.163 The city claimed that the trial
court engaged in viewpoint-based discrimination when it restricted the
prayers of believers of Jesus Christ, while allowing others to pray in
manners agreeable to their beliefs. 164 The appellate court clarified that
although "'[t]he government must abstain from regulating speech when
the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction,"' 165 this does not grant the

154. See supra text and accompanying notes 150-51.
155. 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see also Kristina Sauerwein & Jean
Guccione, Rubin Eyeing Developments in PrayerCase, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at 3.
156. Rubin, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 869.
157.
158.

Id.
1d.

159. Id. The trial court decision was re-affirmed by the California Court of Appeals. Id. at
877.
160. See id. at 869-70.
161. 1d.at 874.
162. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
163. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. In Perry,a divided Supreme Court held that permitting
access to teachers' mailboxes to an incumbent teachers' union, but not a rival union, did not
amount to viewpoint discrimination because government can impose reasonable regulations on
speech, as long as the limitations are necessary to serve a compelling state interest and do not
merely suppress the public officials' speech because it opposes the speaker's view. Id. at 45-47.
See also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46 (holding that viewpoint discrimination is
unconstitutional).
164. See Rubin, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 874-75.
165. Id. at 875 (quoting Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829).
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speaker the right to have an unrestricted power to speak. 166 Rather,
viewpoint discrimination depends on the nature of the speech involved
and the manner of restriction imposed. 167 The appellate court held that
the court order was viewpoint-neutral because it was drawn as narrowly
as possible and the only restriction-the
ban on sectarian prayer-did
68
not advance one faith over another.1
Unlike the court in Cleveland,169 the appellate court in Rubin did not
analyze the court order as a content-based regulation by following the
Cornelius decision.' 70 Rather, by following the U.S. Supreme Court's
analysis in Perry and Rosenberger, the appellate court effectively
addressed whether the order was a viewpoint-based restriction as
applied. 17 1 Although the order did not meet this criterion, 172 the city still

had a chance to properly defend its volunteers' speech.
D. Profane Speech
In speech cases involving profanity, lower courts often uphold city
council meeting regulations without addressing a citizen's viewpoint.
This trend may stem from the fact that the U.S Supreme Court has never
articulated the scope of government authority for policing profanity in
limited public fora.'74 The Court first stated, in Cohen v. California,that
the solution for an audience member who was offended by a profane
word displayed on a jacket is to look the other way. 175 However, the
Court has neither addressed this situation in an applicable limited public
forum, such as a city council meeting, nor set a constitutional
standard. 176 Alternately, lower courts have addressed the disruptive
aspect of profane speech by giving the government the power to
preserve the order and decorum of city council meetings. 77 Yet, lower
166.
167.

See id.
See id.

168.

Id. at 876.

169. See supra Part III.A.1.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 160-68.
172. Rubin, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875.
173. See supra Part III.A.1.
174. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Policing Decorum in the Limited Public (Social Media) Forum,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 25, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/Prawfsblawg/2010/08/
policing-decorum-in-the-limited-public-social-media-forum.html. Professor Lyrissa Lidsky does
clarify that the Supreme Court has addressed this issue in the context of schools and public
broadcasting. See id.
175. 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
176. See Lidsky, supra note 174.
177. See Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 527 F.3d 377, 380 (4th Cir.
2008) (holding that the city's content-neutral policy of suppressing off-topic speech was

constitutional because regulating the orderliness and progress of meetings was a legitimate
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178
courts have rarely discussed the specific issue of profanity.
In the Eleventh Circuit case of Jones v. Heyman at issue was
whether Jones' First Amendment rights were violated when the mayor
silenced and removed him from a City Commission meeting. 179 During
Jones' time to speak, 180 he went off topic and criticized the mayor's
spending habits.'" After the mayor advised Jones to stay on topic, he
responded by saying the mayor was not big enough to remove him. 182
The mayor claimed that Jones' comments and his aggressive behavior
violated Ordinance No. 85-1.183 The court labeled the ordinance as
content-neutral and avoided analyzing its potential for viewpoint-based
discrimination altogether. 184 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
city did not silence Jones' speech based on its content because the
mayor was merely enforcing the city's content-neutral restrictions
imposed on the forum, as the mayor required Jones to stay on topic to
prevent disruption of the meeting. 8 5 The city's ordinance was upheld
because it was narrowly drawn to achieve a significant purpose and
communication
was allowed through other, more appropriate
86
channels. 1
Significantly, the court never addressed Jones' viewpoint, which
may have changed the outcome of the decision.' 87 A reason the court
may have overlooked Jones' viewpoint is that this case was decided
seven years before Rosenberger.'" Nevertheless, the court's dictum,
that Jones' views could be interpreted as critical of the mayor, suggests
an anticipation of viewpoint-based discrimination. 189 As a result of this
government purpose); White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that a council member may stop a disruptive speaker when the speaker is "speaking too long, by
being unduly repetitious, or by extended discussion of irrelevancies."); Jones v. Heyman, 888
F.2d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the mayor's removal of the citizen that spoke
about an off-topic subject at a city council meeting was proper because the citizen disrespected
the forum's rules). But see Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that
removing a speaker from a township board meeting solely because of his utterance of "God
damn," was unconstitutional).
178. See sources cited supra note 177.
179. Jones, 888 F.2d at 1329.
180. Jones had signed up to discuss senior citizens discounts on garbage removal. Id.
181.

Id.

182. Id.
183. Id. Ordinance No. 85-1 § I provides that "lilt shall be unlawful for any person to
disturb or interrupt any meeting .. " and "[t]he use of obscene or profane language, physical
violence of the threat thereof, or other loud and boisterous behavior" qualifies as a disturbance.
Id. at 1329 n.3.
184. Id.at 1331.
185. Id. at 1333.

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 1332-34.
See infra text accompanying notes 215-16.
See supra text accompanying notes 94-101.
See Jones, 888 F.2d at 1332-34; supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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criticism, the mayor could have silenced Jones's speech not because it
was disruptive, but rather because he disagreed with the content of
Jones's message, 190 or post-Rosenberger, disagreed with Jones's
viewpoint. 191 Nevertheless, the court discounted this as a hindsight
inquiry. 192 By ignoring the possibility of the mayor silencing Jones's
speech because of its undesirable message, the court may have abused
its appellate discretion. 193 This is because the court overturned the
district court's decision without explaining how the mayor's censoring
of Jones's speech was unrelated to his distaste for Jones's criticism.194 If
it
the court had instead considered Jones's viewpoint, it is likely that195
would have still upheld the regulation due to his disruptive behavior.
However, despite the Jones decision, courts should not regard profane
addressing viewpoint-based discrimination in
speech as a way to avoid
96
a limited public forum. 1
IV. FLORIDA

SUNSHINE LAWS

Florida Sunshine Laws have emphasized an open and accessible
government to the public without extending the same policy to public
viewpoints. 197 Laws that encourage increased transparency should not
overlook public commentary. Florida's open government is not subject
to accountability without a citizen being free to express his or her
viewpoint at a city council meeting. 198 As scholar Francis Rouke wrote,
"Nothing could be more axiomatic for a democracy than the principle of
exposing the processes of government to relentless public criticism and
scrutiny." 199 A government that opens its meetings to citizens but
suppresses public speech is an ill-balanced democracy because it
enforces laws that legislators have created based on incomplete

190. See Jones, 888 F.2d at 1332-34.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 94-101.
192. Jones, 888 F.2d at 1332.
193. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98
Nw. U. L. REV. 1291, 1321 (2004) (asserting that an appellate court may abuse its discretionary
power by using it as "a license to reverse claimant victories" in obscene speech cases).
194.

See Jones, 888 F.2d at 1332.

195.

See supra text accompanying notes 177-83.

196.

See supra Parts I.B., II.B.

197. Whether Sunshine Laws really facilitate increased participation for citizens in local
government meetings is still an open question. See Adams, supra note 1; Robert L. Cole &
David A. Caputo, The Public Hearing as an Effective Citizen ParticipationMechanism: A Case
Study of the GeneralSharing Program,78 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 404,404-19 (1984).
198. See infra Part IV.A.
199. Francis E. Rouke, Administrative Secrecy: A CongressionalDilemma, 54 AM. POL.

Sci. REv. 684,691 (1960).
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information and unfamiliarity with the voters' demands.2 °°
A. Background
The Florida Sunshine Law, enacted in 1967, provides a basic right
for citizens to access government board meetings, commissions, and
other state and local agencies. 20 ' Florida Statute § 286.011(1) states that
"[a]ll meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or
authority . . . of any county, municipal corporation, or political
subdivision ... are declared to be public meetings open to the public at
have
203
Although Florida's legislators and
,
•. courts
all times ..
neither
participation,
public
of
acknowledged the importance
Florida's constitution nor its Sunshine Laws grant the public the right to
comment at governmental meetings.20 4 For jurisdictions that do permit
public commentary, the Florida Attorney General's office has
recommended that governmental boards adopt rules to ensure that the
meeting's participants behave in an orderly manner.20 5 This rulemaking
power can at times conflict with public participation. 206 For example, a
board may vote to limit a person's opportunity to speak for only a few
minutes, or censor the repetitiveness or disruptiveness of the speech, so
long as the public's right to access the meeting is not restricted. 20'
B. Are Sunshine Laws Really Open?
Content regulations can at times cloud over the government in the
200.

See

RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET. AL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT CASES AND THEORY

17-18 (2008) (citing ALEXANDAR MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-

GOVERNMENT 15-16,24-27 (1948)).
201. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF FLA., Government in the Sunshine: the
"Sunshine" Law, http://www.myflsunshine.com/sun.nsf/pages/law (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
202. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (2011).

203. See Evergreen the Tree Treasurers of Charlotte Cnty., Inc. v. Charlotte Cnty. Bd of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 810 So. 2d 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2002) (holding that the Sunshine
Law requires a public comment period).
204. See Borry & Piotrowski, supra note 5, at 17 nn.v & vii. Neither Florida's Sunshine
Laws nor the Florida Constitution have specifically granted the public with the right to
comment. See id. However, Florida statutes other than the Sunshine Laws do allow the right to
comment. Id. See, for example, Keesler v. Cmty. Mar. Park Assocs., Inc., 32 So. 3d 659, 660-61
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2010), which held that the requirement in the Florida Sunshine Law
that public meetings be "'open to the public"' did not entitle county residents to speak at the
meetings.
205.

See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF FLA., Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual:

What Are the Notice and ProceduralRequirements of the Sunshine Law? (Jan. 14, 2011),
http://www.myflsunshine.com/sun.nsf/sunmanual/A47B8F3CCCDF852566F300582C91.
206. See, e.g., Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1333 (11 th Cir. 1989) (suppressing Jones'
speech because the city needed to regulate the order of its meeting).
207. See id
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sunshine. Florida's Sunshine Laws are problematic because although
citizens may have full access to governmental meetings, citizens are not
afforded the same right to participate. 208 In practice, cities adopt
regulations that restrict speech during public comment sessions without
providing guidelines 20explaining
that such suppression cannot relate to a
9
viewpoint.
speaker's
There is an argument that the Florida Sunshine Laws' emphasis on
openness should not extend to a citizen's speech at meetings.
Proponents of this interpretation argue, "while open meetings legislation
is primarily concerned with facilitating public scrutiny of the
government's decisionmaking [sic] process, it is not concerned with
granting citizens the power to make the decisions themselves. 21 °
Nevertheless, a citizen voicing his or her opinion during a public
comment session will not have the authority to make a decision in place
of a legislative official. 211 Legal scholar Alexander Meiklejohn argued
that self-governance through public speech is not only an American
belief and a constitutional right; it also helps promote better decisionmaking by the legislators and a more efficient body of law. 212 This does
not mean "on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in public
debate .... [T]he vital point[s] . . . [are] that no suggestion of policy
shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather
than another," and that no citizen's speech ma. be "barred because their
views are thought to be false or dangerous." 2 3 Florida Sunshine Laws
will better promote openness in government if public viewpoints
are not
214
suppressed or diluted by stringent content regulations.
C. Three Hypotheticals: ClarificationsAre Needed at the
Administrative Level
Legislators need to clarify the application of the public forum
doctrine in light of the policies behind the Florida Sunshine Laws.215
Without proper guidelines for navigating through the murky doctrine, it
208. See Rowe v. City of Cocoa Beach, 358 F.3d 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2004); Jones, 888
F.2d at 1333; Parkland Republican Club v. City of Parkland, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1354 (S.D.
Fla. 2003).
209.

See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF FLA., supra note 205.

210. David J. Barthel, A Healthy Tan is Better Than Sunburn: Ohio s "Sunshine Law" and
Nonpublic Collective Inquiry Sessions, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 251, 253 (2005).
211. Cf Nicholas Johnson, Open Meetings and Closed Minds: Another Road to the
Mountaintop, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 18 (2004). Open government "[cjreates [m]ore [c]itizen
[a]cceptance of, [c]ooperation with, and [c]onfidence" in the government's decisions. Id
212. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET AL., supranote 200, at 17.
213. Id. (citing MEIKLLEJOHN,supra note 200, at 15-16).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 206-07.
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remains unclear what separates an appropriate curtailment of free
speech from an inappropriate curtailment at the judicial level.
Viewpoint discrimination, or the exclusion of perspectives on a subject
that is otherwise permitted in the forum 216 may occur "either in the
forum's creation or its administration. '"217 In order to tell if political,
religious, or profane speech is censored because of a citizen's
viewpoint, a forum administrator must act under clear and objective
standards that are viewpoint-neutral.2 1 As the hypotheticals from the
introduction illustrate below, the policies behind the Florida Sunshine
Laws may not extend to citizens' speech at city council meetings. It is
advisable for Florida's Attorney General to address this problem by
recommending clearer guidelines for public comment sessions and for
local governments to create laws that limit a city's unbridled discretion
for suppressing speech.
1. Political Speech: Hypothetical One
In the first hypothetical, Bob violated the city's regulation
prohibiting campaign messages during a public comment session.
Although Bob's speech is political, it is not clear under the public forum
doctrine what type of scrutiny a court would apply to the regulation. If
the instant court followed the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Cornelius, it could apply strict scrutiny to the regulation and categorize
it as content-based. 2 r 9- Like the Cornelius Court, the instant court could
exclude Bob's political speech because the city's regulation was
reasonable in light 22
of
the purpose of the forum, which was to avoid
0
political preference.
This hypothetical is distinguished from Cleveland, because here,
there was a specific regulation prohibiting Bob's button that displayed
the mayor smoking marijuana. 2 2 1 Also, unlike Cleveland, a mayor
222
Sam's business supports the
supporter's speech was not suppressed.
mayor's campaign and his speech was related to promoting his business.
By promoting his business, the mayor's campaign is directly benefitted.
The fact that Sam's speech is so closely related to a campaign message
further distinguishes this hypothetical from both Cornelius and
216. See Jacobs, supra note 15, at 630. Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs argues that
viewpoint inquiry must incorporate both the substance of the speech and the procedure of the
forum's administration. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.at 634.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 10- 11 & 77-80.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
221. See supra Part II.A. 1.
222. See supra Part III.A.1.
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Cleveland.223 Because speech promoting the mayor's campaign is
permitted while Bob's campaign message is suppressed, this may very
well qualify as viewpoint discrimination. 4 This hypothetical
demonstrates that even when a citizen's speech violates a regulation, in
the absence of clearer guidelines, a forum administrator may promote
one viewpoint over another.
2. Religious Speech: Hypothetical Two
In the second hypothetical, it is clear that Paul, the preacher,
followed the city's rules by sending a card with his desired speech topic
to the forum administrator ahead of time. Paul's speech was censored at
the meeting not because he went off topic or spoke for too many
minutes, but rather, because he used religious words and references in
order to convey his disdain for the opening of an abortion clinic. The
city told Paul to stop speaking because of a concern that his speech
would incite the meeting's audience to violence, especially in light of
his comment, "Jesus thinks abortion doctors are murderers."
Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel and
Rosenberger, and also the Rubin court, have reviewed regulations or
court orders that suppress religious speech under the viewpoint-based
category, in this hypothetical, it is not clear how the instant court would
rule. 25 Because this scenario involves the controversial topics of
religious speech and abortion, the forum administrator may have
legitimately suppressed the content of Paul's message based on the
likely possibility of its disruption of the meeting or incitement of a fullblown riot. In that scenario, the city's prevention of a disturbance
promoted a compelling state interest of safety and was achieved by the
least restrictive means, pacifying the source of the disruption. 226 Thus,
the city's regulation may pass a court's strict scrutiny standard.227
Alternatively, the hypothetical court's suppression of Paul's speech
may be rendered unconstitutional as viewpoint-based discrimination.
Paul followed all of the content-neutral rules of the meeting by
complying with the required time limit for speaking and by staying on
topic. 2 In light of these facts, the hypothetical court may deem the
city's suppression unconsitutional because it censored Paul's religious
viewpoint that abortion is murder, which is merely one side of the
223.

See supra Part III.A.1; supra text accompanying notes 77-80.

224. Bob may sue the mayor based on improper application of the statute. See supra notes
12-13 and accompanying text.
225. See supra Part II.A.2; supra text accompanying notes 153-66.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
228. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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debate regarding a city's opening of an abortion clinic. 229 If the city
prohibits one side of the debate on a pre-approved topic, the opening of
the abortion clinic, the city impermissibly discriminates against Paul's
beliefs and opinions.
Accordingly, whether the city could properly censor Paul's speech
depends on how the forum is defined and what level of scrutiny is
applied.230 Because the outcome of this hypothetical is determined by
the court's labeling, local governments would benefit from having
clearer guidelines to regulate speech at meetings.
3. Profane Speech: Hypothetical Three
In the last hypothetical, Connor, the impassioned college student, is
outraged by the city's ordinance denying sexual education funding.
When he spoke about it during the public comment session, he got
agitated and described the ordinance as "fu*king bullsh*t." The city
suppressed Connor's speech because it had a regulation that prevented
unlawful disturbances during city council meetings. The city has
routinely used the regulation to suppress profanity in order to contribute
to the order and efficiency of the forum.
In this hypothetical, the murky categories stemming from the public
forum doctrine are most apparent because a court may label the city's
regulation as content-neutral, content-based, or viewpoint-based. 231 The
reason why the city suppressed Connor's speech is unclear. Like the
city in Jones, the instant city here may have suppressed Connor's
speech because it considered profane speech as disruptive to the
forum. 2 32 In addition, similar to the court in Jones, the court may
categorize the regulation as content-neutral, and thus, find that the
regulation meets intermediate scrutiny because it suppressed Connor's
speech, but not other citizens' speech on the same topic, as the
233
regulation served the purpose of preserving the meeting's order.
However, it is just as likely that the court would consider the regulation
content-based and review it under strict scrutiny because the city
profane content as unreasonable in light of the
regarded the speech's
234
forum's purpose.
Furthermore, there are the additional problems of determining
whether a citizen's profane speech is subject to First Amendment
protection and whether the city's statute is overbroad. A city's
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
See supra notes 8, 15-22 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 177-94.
See supra text accompanying notes 177-94.
See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
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determination that profane speech is of low-value and does not require
constitutional protection is a moral judgment.235 Thus, the city might
have enforced its regulation to suppress Connor's speech because of its
viewpoint-based, moral aversion to profanity. Like the Stevens Court,
the instant court may find that the regulation is unconstitutional because
it is overly broad and permits the censoring of non-disruptive speech. 236
However, the city's ability to make a viewpoint-based determination to
censor his speech is still entirely subjective due to the court's ad hoc
application.237 It is unclear if the court would overturn the regulation
because this decision depends on whether the moral viewpoints of the
judges would coincide with the city's viewpoint on profanity. 238 Yet,
what is clear, is that the court's application of the public forum doctrine,
in the absence of proper guidelines, may allow a city to censor a
citizen's viewpoint by labeling such speech as inappropriate.
CONCLUSION

A solution to the public forum doctrine's categorical problem is that
all courts should place greater weight on the effect of regulations in
determining whether a law is content-based, content-neutral, or
viewpoint-based. 239 In the city council cases discussed in Part III, the
standard of review for the regulations in question were based on the
court's interpretation of the law's purpose, and thus, arbitrarily
applied.24 ° In Cleveland and Jones, it was a mayor's opponent whose
speech paid a price based on the court's initial content-based or contentneutral categorization.24'
In contrast, in Rubin, the U.S. Supreme Court did not subjectively
categorize the court order as content-neutral from the start.2 2
Alternatively, the Court looked at the impact of the court order before
defining what category it fell under and then determined what level of
scrutiny should apply.243 This approach eliminates the "serious danger
235. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
236. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010); supra text accompanying
note 106.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
239. See Calvert, supra note 12, at 71; supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
240. See supra text accompanying note 60; supra Part III.
241. See Cleveland v. City of Cocoa Beach, 221 F. App'x 875, 878-79 (11 th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the regulation was content-based); Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1332 (11th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the regulation was content-neutral); supra text accompanying notes
132-33 & 179.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 167-71.
243. See Rubin v. City of Burbank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 874-75 (Cal. App. 2002); supra
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that superficial and phony legislative intent offering a content-neutral
rationale for such laws hides content-based objectives,"'244 and hence,
censors a citizen's viewpoint at a city council meeting.
Another solution is that Florida's Attorney General should
recommend guidelines for local governments for enacting clearer rules
that avoid viewpoint-based discrimination during public comment
sessions. Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs has proposed a three-step
method for the government to use in determining whether viewpoint
discrimination has occurred.2 45 The first step is for the government to
identify the forum's boundaries, 246 such as the "subject matter, mode of
expression and speaker status." 247 The second step is to determine
whether the forum is reasonable in light of its purpose. 24 8 Professor
Jacobs recommends that cities create clear guidelines to serve as a
check to forum administrators' discretion in order to prevent forum
administrators from engaging in viewpoint discrimination. 24 9 An
example of a check is a law that directs forum administrators to warn a
speaker before suppressing his or her speech due to a profane word. The
last step is to review whether the government has consistently applied
its guidelines to the forum's administration. 250 If the regulation that
suppressed a citizen's speech satisfies the three prongs, then the
regulation is viewpoint-neutral.251
In light of the Florida Sunshine Laws, local governments must adopt
clearer guidelines for forum administrators to follow because the public
forum doctrine, as it currently stands, is unclear and inconsistently
applied. As a result, forum administrators are granted unfettered
discretion to impose their moral beliefs and opinions at the expense of
free and lawful speech. Merely promoting government transparency
through open records and meetings allows the government to essentially
ignore the concerns of its citizens. Open government, without free
speech, clouds over the true purpose of the Florida Sunshine Laws.
Compelling the establishment of clear guidelines at the local
government level will curtail forum administrators' unbridled discretion
text accompanying notes 162-68.
244. Calvert, supra note 12, at 109.
245. Jacobs, supra note 15, at 630.
246. Id. at 630-31; see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
247. Jacobs, supra note 15, at 631. This step is difficult to apply because the boundaries
can be both content and viewpoint-based. For example, a governmental purpose of allowing
only candidates with the largest support to participate in a televised debate is legitimate and not

viewpoint-based because such candidates are the ones that will appear on the voter's ballots.
Thus, favoring one candidate over another is not the only purpose of the regulation.
248. See supra text accompanying note 46.
249. See Jacobs, supra note 15, at 633.
250. Id. at 634
251. See id. at 630-34.
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that currently limits the expression of unpopular, but constitutionally
protected, viewpoints. Open meetings along with open discourse are
essential to democracy.

